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Introduction 
As a highly-respected chronicler of the state of modern economics and its history, and in particular 
in his promotion of pluralism in economics, John King provides ample material on which to base 
a further consideration of pluralism. It is challenging to single out any particular publications by 
John King, given the breadth and depth of his knowledge, and the careful analysis and bold 
argument he consistently displays in his work. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I focus 
on two papers which I have found particularly striking. A central piece of work for the focus of 
this volume is his discussion of the case for pluralism (King 2002).  My purpose here is to relate 
that paper to another striking paper arguing against the significant drive within modern economics 
to specify microfoundations. I first heard this argument as a paper presentation at the IMK/FMM 
annual conference in Berlin in 2008 and then at a symposium on microfoundations at SOAS in 
2009; since then he has published a more full account of his analysis of microfoundations in his 
2012 monograph. Both papers were thought provoking, in terms of reflection on the two 
conceptual areas and on the different stances on them which were revealed. The discussion here is 
a set of reflections provoked by these papers. 
The first paper considers three different arguments for pluralism within heterodox economics. It is 
important to establish at the start what is being meant by pluralism, since it can refer to any of the 
levels of philosophy, methodology and theory (see further Dow 1997). The three arguments refer 
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primarily to the philosophical level, i.e. methodological pluralism - the acceptance of, and respect 
for, a range of methodological approaches on the grounds that no one approach can be 
demonstrated to be best given the nature of the subject matter. The meaning at the level of 
methodology is pluralist methodologies, i.e. particular approaches which advocate use of a range 
of methods. Methodological pluralism could in principle allow for a methodological approach 
which advocates only one method. But the prime case of such a methodology is the mainstream 
insistence on mathematical formalism, which takes a methodological monist approach. There is 
further theoretical pluralism, i.e. a range of theories. Since methodological approach is regarded 
in mainstream discourse as settled, this is usually the meaning of pluralism employed there. While 
there is a variety of theories within mainstream economics, nevertheless they are all conditioned 
by the shared ontology, epistemology and methodology by which mainstream economics is 
defined (Dow 2007). 
While methodological pluralism involves acceptance that there will be a range of approaches to 
economics, it does not mean that any economist should use several approaches simultaneously, 
since to do so would in effect mean developing a new, synthetic approach. Rather it means that 
any economist should be sufficiently methodologically aware to be able to make the case for her 
own approach relative to others. No approach can be definitively demonstrated to be superior, but 
that does not mean that argument for one’s own approach cannot be forceful. Heterodox 
economists are inevitably methodologically aware in that the case has to be made relative to the 
mainstream approach. Nevertheless there are some apparent expressions of monism in heterodoxy 
as a challenge to pluralism (see Dow 2008 for a flavour of the debate). At the very start of the 
pluralism paper, John King nails his colours firmly to the mast: ‘Is there a single correct alternative 
to neoclassical economics? The purpose of this short paper is to suggest that there is not’.  
2 
 
King (2002) focuses on the Sraffian, Post Keynesian and institutionalist arguments for pluralism, 
all of which are based on an ontology which defies any prospect of one general overarching theory 
or theoretical approach. But all have exclusions from this openness to different approaches. These 
exclusions are different but overlapping: Sraffians exclude neoclassical economic theory, Post 
Keynesians exclude exclusive use of mathematical formalism while institutionalists exclude any 
theory which purports to be general. All the arguments about exclusion involve some application 
of the principle of consistency, although at different levels. Sraffians point to theoretical 
inconsistency in neoclassical economics with respect to capital, while Post Keynesians and 
institutionalists focus more on inconsistencies between ontology and epistemology in criticising 
methodological and theoretical exclusiveness, respectively. But is it inconsistent for a pluralist to 
exclude methodologies or theories in this way, or is this just one implication of structured 
pluralism? John King’s paper concludes that differences between pluralists can be overcome by 
communication, but how far is communication between different approaches itself open to 
inconsistencies of meaning?   
The second paper similarly pulls no punches, demonstrating further differences among heterodox 
economists, given that many, like orthodox economists, employ the concept of microfoundations 
which he so effectively critiques, drawing on the philosophy literature. Again consistency is a 
continuing theme. The case for microfoundations has been based on the view that macroeconomics 
and microeconomics should be consistent, although John King goes on to explain that neither need 
be foundational to the other. He argues however that, while some inconsistency between the two 
levels is to be expected, nevertheless one aim should be to reduce inconsistency. Further, John 
King argues not only for theory to be consistent with the economist’s social and philosophical 
approach, but that this approach should be foundational. Here we see an echo of the arguments for 
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pluralism in the earlier paper, based on consistency between theory on the one hand and ontology 
and epistemology on the other. 
While the concept of consistency arises in both papers, it is worth reflecting further on what exactly 
is being meant by this term too. The purpose of this paper is to try to unpack the different ways in 
which the consistency concept applies to both papers. We consider consistency at three levels, but 
in the reverse order to the outline of pluralism above: the theoretical, methodological and 
philosophical levels. We therefore start with theoretical consistency, which then raises the issue at 
the methodological level of the system of logic within which consistency is being applied, in 
particular whether it is classical logic or human logic. Next we consider philosophical consistency, 
between ontology, epistemology, methodology and theory. In the process we consider further John 
King’s argument for social and philosophical foundations. We then consider the issue of 
consistency with respect to communication. This involves consideration of the concept of 
vagueness. Finally we review the implications of this discussion of consistency for the future 
direction of heterodox economics, and in particular for Post Keynesian economics. 
King (2008) highlights the powerful role of metaphor in the history of ideas right at the start of the 
microfoundations paper. In the process of the exploration here of consistency in relation to 
pluralism and microfoundations, we will bear in mind the powerful metaphor which King develops 
from Geoff Harcourt’s account of Post Keynesian methodology: ‘horses for courses’ (see further 
Harcourt 1987, 1996). This metaphor captures the idea that methodology should reflect the 
problem at hand and the real context in which it arises. There is disagreement between the three 
heterodox groups represented in the pluralism paper in terms of their respective views on 
formalism, with openness to different methods for specific problems being greatest for 
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institutionalists and least for Sraffians; this can be understood as a different choice as to the 
appropriate type of horse for a particular course.  
King (2002) points out that the need for some consistency puts some limits on the horses. With 
respect to theoretical consistency, he points to inconsistencies in mainstream economics, 
concluding that each horse must ‘have four legs and a jockey and proceed anti-clockwise around 
the course’ and further that ‘all four legs must be pointing in the same direction’. But his argument 
that more theoretical consistency is desirable requires further reflection on what exactly is meant 
by that. At risk of torturing the metaphor, we will see how we might develop it further as the 
discussion proceeds. We return to an early statement of the ‘horses for courses’ position in the 
final section on Post Keynesian economics. 
 
Theoretical Consistency 
The argument for theoretical consistency arises in both papers. It is central to the microfoundations 
paper, where mainstream economics is shown to have been driven by a commitment to increase 
consistency between the micro and macro levels of analysis – indeed to make the two levels of 
theory perfectly consistent. John King’s main argument is against requiring the micro level to be 
established prior to the macro level (or indeed vice versa), such that one level provides the 
foundation for the other. ‘Foundations, to repeat, must come first. The constitutive nature of the 
foundational metaphor is most evident, and most damaging, here’ (King 2008: 36, emphasis in 
original).  
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A secondary argument is against giving priority in economics practice to the exercise of promoting 
consistency. Nevertheless, other things being equal, increased consistency is to be pursued:  
‘The position that I shall be defending is this: consistency between microeconomics and 
macroeconomics is desirable, but it does not entail that the former is the foundation of the 
latter. In more general terms, the fact that there is (or may be, or appears to be) some 
inconsistency between two related bodies of knowledge, A and B, does not entail that A must 
become the foundation for B, or for that matter that B must become the foundation for A’ (King 
2008: 3-4). 
Keynesian economics has been criticised by the mainstream on the grounds of lack of consistency 
between the macro and micro levels. It has therefore been particularly appealing to heterodox 
economists to point out that mainstream itself involves serious theoretical inconsistencies. The one 
to which most attention has been paid is the mainstream treatment of capital, where inconsistency 
completely undermines the whole theoretical edifice built on the principle of substitution, which, 
it is shown, does not apply to capital (Kurz and Salvadori 2000). John King highlights this critique 
of mainstream economics in relation to the Sraffian case for pluralism – but a pluralism without 
mainstream economics. For Sraffians therefore theoretical consistency is so crucial that its 
violation justifies rejection, even by pluralists.  
If it is to be taken for granted that theoretical consistency is desirable, where does that leave 
heterodox economics, where inconsistencies persist, notably between the micro and macro levels 
within any one approach? Inconsistencies persist also between theories within heterodox schools 
of thought, such as Post Keynesian economics, as seen in the debates between the different Post 
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Keynesian approaches to monetary theory (see for example Arestis and Sawyer, eds, 2006). There 
are even more inconsistencies between heterodox schools of thought. 
Clearly there are inconsistencies and inconsistencies, and some are more important than others; 
indeed when is an inconsistency a sign of incoherence and when is it just a difference (see further 
Dow 1990)? A clue to how to deal with this is given in King’s (2008: 11) account of Chick’s (2002) 
justification for not pursuing completely consistent Post Keynesian microfoundations, whose title 
refers to ‘necessary compromise’: ‘Chick therefore rejected the possibility of impeccably logical 
microfoundations’, which could be provided only at the expense of “the logic of the whole”’. The 
stumbling block in any effort to develop consistent microfoundations is the fictional nature of the 
auctioneer. The nature of the theoretical relationship between microeconomics and 
macroeconomics then is something open to reasoned argument and persuasion rather than 
definitive logical demonstration. 
Consistency takes its meaning from logic, but there is more than one logic on which methodology 
can be based, and there is more than one sphere of logic. First we consider two main types of logic: 
classical logic and human logic, as applied to theory. But we cannot go far with this without 
considering the sphere of application – what is the ‘whole’ to which Chick refers? In particular we 
need to think about the justification for using one or other type of logic at the philosophical level 
– this will be the subject of the following section. 
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Logical Consistency: classical and human logic 
It is common to equate logic with classical logic, which has indeed dominated Western thought. 
This system of logic is deductivist, deriving conclusions by means of deductive logic from 
premises which are taken to be true. If the logic is correct the conclusions are then also true. If the 
logic is incorrect this can be proved by identifying a logical contradiction – an inconsistency. 
Within this type of logic inconsistency can be identified definitively and is something to be 
eradicated since it undermines the entire argument. Where a body of theory follows classical logic, 
it takes the form of a deductivist system, all of which is founded on premises which refer to the 
lowest level, i.e. it is reductionist.  
This is the type of logic employed by mainstream economics and which underpinned the drive for 
microfoundations of macroeconomics: that macroeconomic propositions should be derivable from 
the axioms of rational optimising behaviour which are taken to be true, or at least ‘as if’ true. The 
theoretical system which is built on such principles is a closed system and lends itself to formal 
mathematical expression. (In terms of the racehorse metaphor, whatever the racecourse and its 
current condition, there is only one type of horse which is acceptable.) Further, within such a 
system the notion of consistency is unambiguous and is closely aligned with the notion of rigour. 
No wonder there is such unquestioning support for consistency as a principle.  
The presumed truth of the premises is critical to classical logic. In the case of economics, the 
axioms of rational choice have been the object of sustained questioning. Within mainstream 
economics, such questioning (as in the new behavioural economics) is aimed at establishing more 
robust axioms. But in heterodox economics, the prospect of any axioms being established as true 
is questioned and an alternative logic preferred in order to deal with the absence of certainty about 
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any assumptions. This is the type of logic employed by Keynes, variously termed ‘ordinary logic’ 
or ‘human logic’ (Gerrard 1992). For Keynes (as for Hume) reason (and thus deductivism) was 
insufficient for justifying belief as the basis for action. Because of the complex, evolving nature 
of the economic system, we can never expect to uncover true causal mechanisms, far less predict 
on their basis. Rather than relying on one reasoned argument, he argued that beliefs are more 
soundly based if they draw on a range of types of argument and/or of language (Harcourt 1984, 
1987). Further, since contexts of analysis differ, choice of types of argument and evidence should 
reflect the problem at hand: ‘horses for courses’.  
This logic can be characterised, in contrast to the Cartesian/Euclidean character of a system of 
thought based on classical logic, as Babylonian thought, based on the Babylonian style of 
mathematics (Dow 2012). This approach builds up knowledge by means of a range of arguments 
which are incommensurate (otherwise they could collapse into one argument). Thus one line of 
argument might use the ceteris paribus argument to focus on one sector, treating the rest of the 
economy as exogenous. Another line of argument might focus on the interrelations between that 
sector and another with which it interacts, treating all the rest as exogenous. This would seem 
unexceptional to a mainstream economist, but their expectation would be that the two analyses 
could then be combined in an overarching formal analysis, derivable from the rationality axioms. 
Within human logic, rather, the expectation is that different types of argument will help to build 
up the strands of an argument, but there is no basis for treating any of the provisional assumptions 
as axioms. In terms of the ‘horses for courses’ metaphor, we can consider each horse as 
encompassing a particular combination of characteristics, each characteristic representing one 
method or line of argument. Schools of thought may emerge around a particular range (a stable) 
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of combinations of types of argument within human logic (different horses), providing some 
structure to what in principle would be endless possibilities (the category ‘horse’ is bounded).  
From a classical logic point of view, the human logic approach is riddled with inconsistencies. But 
within human logic it is inevitable that different (inconsistent?) assumptions will be used for 
different purposes. The issue is the domain of application of an assumption, which is universal in 
the case of classical logic and local in the case of human logic. This follows from the closed nature 
of a system of classical logic, such that any contradiction undermines the whole system. Herein 
lies the force of the heterodox critiques of orthodoxy which identify inconsistencies in terms of 
classical logic, as in the capital controversies. In an open system there will be differences between 
lines of reasoning and the assumptions on which they are built, but these need not involve 
inconsistency. Inconsistency is only definitive within any one partial analysis, for example if 
perfect foresight were assumed for some agents and uncertainty for others within one model. 
Within human logic it is therefore not legitimate necessarily to regard different assumptions as 
entailing inconsistency since the domains are different. There is no overarching closed deductive 
edifice to be challenged by apparent contradiction. 
Whitehead (1938: 76) concludes his discussion of consistency as follows: ‘Thus inconsistency is 
relative to the abstraction involved’. A microeconomic theory may involve different assumptions 
from a macroeconomic theory, but if they are each treated as partial systems rather than part of a 
formal overarching system, no inconsistency need be involved. There is an important distinction 
between models (which require provisional closure) and theoretical systems:  
‘The key is how far the theoretical system is identified with its models. Within an open 
theoretical system, there is scope for changing the assumptions, boundaries or ceteris 
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paribus conditions to suit the theorist’s immediate purpose, as for example assuming that 
long-term expectations are fixed in one model but not in another. Discussion surrounding 
these models extends beyond the models in order to take account of what has been “kept 
at the back of one’s head”. A closed theoretical system on the other hand tends to be 
identified with its models’ (Chick and Dow 2005: 369-70). 
Whitehead (1938: 75) had seemed to imply that inconsistency was not an issue within what we 
now refer to as an open-system mode of thought: ‘[b]y means of process the universe escapes from 
the limitations of the finite. Process is the immanence of the infinite in the finite; whereby all 
bounds are burst, and all inconsistencies dissolved.’ This has echoes of postmodernism, which 
celebrates paradox as one of its features, something which is anathema to classical logic (and 
different from the reasoned compromise over consistency in the Post Keynesian approach, for 
example). But to see the prevalence of process is not to give up on theoretical argument. I have 
argued elsewhere (Dow 2001a) that postmodernism runs the risk of presenting itself in terms of 
classical logic, and thus as employing the dual of modernist classical logic, which is absence of 
logic. In terms of the ‘horses for courses’ metaphor, there would be no horserace.  
Of course postmodernists do in fact employ logic, for example to justify general arguments, but 
this is inconsistent with the dual of classical logic. Similarly, McCloskey (1986) has shown that 
mainstream economists aren’t consistent either in their use of logic – an example of 
methodological inconsistency. While classical logic is central to the official discourse in 
publications, informal, unofficial discourse in fact employs a range of types of argument more in 
line with human logic. It should not be surprising that deductive logic is insufficient to demonstrate 
the superiority of one line of argument over another. The failure of the Bourbaki project to 
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represent mathematics as a completely closed system provides ample illustration of the problems. 
Indeed the continuing inconsistency between pure and applied work in mainstream economics can 
be understood in terms of the primacy of the consistency principle in pure mathematics, when 
compared to applied mathematics (Weintraub 2002). But even in empirical work, the drive for 
internal consistency has overridden concerns with realism (Wren-Lewis 2011).  
But the implication is that a completely internally consistent closed formal system representing 
the economy is unattainable, however persistently it is pursued. But in practice the charge of 
theoretical inconsistency in terms of classical logic has proved to be insufficient for theory 
rejection, as we have seen by the waiving aside by the orthodoxy of heterodox arguments about 
inconsistencies with respect to capital, even though such methodological inconsistency is 
straightforward since the stated primacy of consistency within mainstream economics takes its 
meaning from classical logic.  
It clearly matters whether inconsistency is understood in terms of classical logic or human logic. 
It is appropriate to critique mainstream economics for theoretical and methodological 
inconsistency on its own, classical logic, terms. For heterodox economics, a critique on grounds 
of theoretical inconsistency within the body of theory as a whole (rather than any partial analysis) 
needs to be expressed in terms of human logic. Similarly methodological inconsistency is only 
relevant if it is identified in terms of human logic. But to understand what that entails we need to 
return to Chick’s ‘logic of the whole’. The discussion above has been straying from issues of 
methodological consistency into issues of philosophical consistency. We have seen the importance 
of ontology, or how we understand the subject matter. We turn now to consider philosophical 
consistency: the logic of the whole. 
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Philosophical Consistency 
While King (2008) argues against the notion of theoretical foundations, he does advocate social 
and philosophical foundations. I understand his discussion of social foundations as referring to 
ontology and the philosophical foundations as referring to epistemology. What he is arguing 
therefore is that theorising should not only be consistent with a particular ontology, and also a 
particular epistemology but that these are both prior to theorising. When heterodox economists 
argue that the nature of the social world is such that it does not yield lawlike behaviour and thus 
any prospect of demonstrating which is the best theory to represent it, they are making a 
consistency argument – not consistency within a closed theoretical system, but consistency 
between the theoretical system and the nature of the subject matter. (In terms of the ‘horses for 
courses’ metaphor, it is the understanding of the nature of the racecourse and its current conditions 
which determines the choice of horse to run.) Thus Lawson (1997) argues for open-system 
theorising (which employs human logic) to address an open-system reality. Since there is no 
demonstrably best form of theorising about an open system, as King (2002) explains, there will be 
a range of open theoretical systems each employing its own range of methods, i.e. pluralism. 
(Different owners will have a range of horses in their stables, based on their understandings of the 
nature of the course.)  
That each of these systems adopts different ranges of assumptions and methods implies 
inconsistency in the sense of differences at the methodological and theoretical levels between 
different approaches. But for heterodox economics there is consistency with the particular open-
system ontology of each system. In contrast, Lawson (1997) points out that the closed-system 
theorising of mainstream economics is only consistent with a closed-system reality. To the extent 
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that many mainstream economists in fact believe the real social world to be open, they are being 
philosophically inconsistent. (There is only one type of horse to be run, even if the owner knows 
it to be unsuited to any course on which the race will be run.) 
This argument implies that philosophical consistency trumps theoretical consistency (which in any 
case depends on epistemology including the type of logic employed). The case for pluralism rests 
on philosophical consistency. Further it would appear that philosophy (ontology and 
epistemology) should indeed be foundational.  I am associated with this view, not least because of 
the title of my recent book, Foundations for New Economic Thinking, but also because I have long 
argued for increased awareness of the philosophical assumptions implicit in economic theory and 
the need to ensure philosophical consistency. So it might seem perverse to raise issues with it. 
Nevertheless I would like to raise again some issues with a uni-directional version of foundations 
(see further Dow 2001b).  
Everything follows from ontology. Yet our understanding of reality is a complex product of 
socially-mediated experience. Indeed the philosophy of economics is performative to the extent 
that our understanding of reality and the corresponding appropriate epistemology can be the result 
of our assimilation into a mainstream approach to economics. For society at large, the reality may 
be performative too, to the extent that the media, government and business organisations accept 
the mainstream account of the real social world and the appropriate way to build knowledge about 
it. In particular, if mainstream economics succeeds in representing formal mathematical systems 
as the most rigourous and inconsistency within these systems as a sign of defective science, 
economists and economic agents alike are encouraged to understand economic behaviour as driven 
by rational choice and mathematical modelling as the best way to proceed in building up 
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knowledge. We have had ample evidence in the financial crisis of this performativity, when 
financial deregulation, confidence in the capacity for risk assessment and even reregulation took 
this view, with real consequences. Ontology is then affected by epistemology and methodology. 
This reverse causation can also occur in a more constructive way. Where philosophy is 
foundational, economists may be expected to follow instruction from philosophers, something 
which mainstream economists in particular have been notably reluctant to do. Even where lip 
service is paid to philosophy of science, such as the work of Popper or Lakatos, the practice has 
not been consistent with it (Blaug 1980). Where the argument for focusing on philosophical 
foundations stands the best chance is where there is significant input from practising economists, 
not least because practice informs philosophy. This is not just a matter of rhetoric, but a matter of 
developing methodological principles through practice. 
These two arguments may seem like quibbles relative to the important argument for social and 
philosophical foundations, but they are in fact symptomatic of the particular philosophical 
foundations of heterodox economics, that the different levels interact and in both directions. 
Ontology and epistemology are foundational in that they need to be addressed consciously when 
developing and justifying one’s approach. This is not incompatible with acknowledging that, from 
a systemic perspective, ontology and epistemology are themselves ultimately endogenous. 
 
Communication and Consistency 
King (2002) notes the inconsistencies between the three arguments for pluralism he sets out. But 
I agree with his conclusion that pluralism does not mean methodological or theoretical uniformity, 
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even when making the case for pluralism – in fact the point of pluralism is that it does not. Rather 
pluralism entails communication between different approaches. There is sufficient philosophical 
commonality – essentially each approach is identified with an open-system ontology out of the 
many possibilities and an open-system epistemology out of the many possibilities.  
Communication itself requires some level of consistency, which different ontologies and 
epistemologies might be thought to belie. But the philosophical foundations provide the solution. 
For a closed-system ontology and epistemology, meanings are fixed and precise such that there 
should be no scope for communication difficulties. Indeed it is one of the arguments for 
mathematical formalism that it ensures just such a commensurability. Mathematics is regarded as 
a particularly precise language, but its precision is internal and does not extend to application. 
Incommensurability arises for mainstream theory outside the system in terms of the subject matter 
which is excluded because of the mathematical method, but more generally in terms of the 
translation of formal terms into real experience, i.e. in application to the real world (see Harcourt 
1984 for an account of the history of this line of argument). Since mainstream methodology is 
exclusively mathematical there is no solution other than to treat application as an art requiring a 
different methodology which is inconsistent with the methodology which produced the pure theory 
which is to be applied (Colander 2002). In order to avoid methodological contradiction, the 
solution has been to separate off the area of application where meanings lose their precision and 
inconsistencies may arise. 
For open-system epistemologies, identification and definition of categories is provisional within 
an evolving environment. Context is of critical importance, requiring adaptation of theories and 
concepts. Not only may different strands of argument employ different ‘languages’ (Harcourt 
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1984), but verbal language has particular advantage in being vague, allowing overlapping 
meanings which allow conversation. The issue of the precision (or otherwise) of language arose 
within the debates between rationalism and common sense philosophy early in the twentieth 
century in Cambridge (see Coates, 1996 and Davis’s, 1999, review article). While rationalist 
argument aimed for precision, this precision was less clearly appealing when arguments were 
applied to the real world. Harcourt (1992: 276) suggests that Marshall made the choice in favour 
of real-world application at the cost of precision: ‘it is better to be vaguely right than precisely 
wrong’ (an expression acquired from W Carr, via Shove). The vagueness of ordinary language, 
corresponding to ordinary logic, has the virtue of allowing greater scope for correspondence 
between reasoned argument and the real world. The scope for ambiguity allows for change in the 
subject matter, because meaning of verbal language is more flexible than the meaning of 
mathematical terms or data series. The meaning of verbal terms further tends to be complex rather 
than singular, incorporating a range of connotations.  
But even in mathematics and the physical sciences terms are vague in the sense that their meaning 
has changed over the years. The metaphors we use in economics benefit from their vagueness. 
Game theory for example draws on the metaphor of the game and the cluster of meanings attached 
to it (Coates, 1996: chapter 2). Similarly, the metaphor of the market benefits from its vagueness. 
That is what allows Becker to extend market analysis into the family context. It may be that the 
market is precisely defined for the purposes of deductive theory, in terms of preferences defined 
in a precise way with respect to the abstract concept of rational economic man. But what the 
rhetoric literature has taught us is that how we actually understand and discuss this theory and 
these concepts draws on our wider understanding of the world. This is made possible by the 
vagueness of our use of what are intended to be precise terms.  
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But vagueness is only helpful where there is significant overlap of meaning. Where meanings are 
very different the use of a common language can impede communication. The confusion caused 
by the different meanings of rationality is a case in point, just as here we are focusing on 
distinctions between different meanings of ‘consistency’. 
 
Conclusion: Post Keynesian Economics and Consistency  
King (2008) makes clear the quite different (methodological and theoretical) positions taken on 
microfoundations within heterodox economics. If heterodox economics is to progress within the 
hoped-for pluralist economics, then it is important to address differences which imply incoherence. 
But shared philosophical foundations and the vagueness of language should facilitate 
communication and therefore debate. We have also argued that theoretical ‘inconsistencies’ are 
inevitable within heterodox economics given the open-system approach and the human logic by 
which it is pursued. It is consistency with ontology which is the most important. 
This issue of consistency within heterodox economics, and particularly within Post Keynesian 
economics has come up before, implicitly in comparison with mainstream economics which 
emphasises internal consistency. In 1988, Hamouda and Harcourt published an account of three 
strands within Post Keynesian economics and posed the question of how far this school of thought 
is coherent. This paper elicited a response from Backhouse (1988) which in effect focused on the 
coherence of mainstream economics in comparison to Post Keynesian economics. Because Post 
Keynesian economics does not prioritise theoretical consistency – indeed argues against doing so 
– then it inevitably qualifies as a degenerating Lakatosian research programme (because of what 
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Backhouse perceives as ad hocery). Alternatively, he suggests that a Kuhnian interpretation would 
classify Post Keynesian as immature relative to mainstream economics. It is clear that the 
conclusion that Post Keynesianism is deficient was based on the charge of theoretical and 
methodological inconsistency in its classical logic sense. 
There was a further round of debate when Walters and Young (1996) published a set of arguments 
that Post Keynesianism lacked coherence, but this time referring also to different accounts of 
philosophical foundations. This paper drew a strong response from Arestis, Dunn and Sawyer 
(1999) who explained the prevalence of commonalities in what Walters and Young had identified 
as differences. The possibility of differences at the philosophical level requires serious attention. 
The pluralist methodology of Post Keynesian economics requires that there be multiple strands of 
reasoning, involving different methods and generating different partial theories. But a school of 
thought is defined by its shared methodology, which requires a shared ontology and epistemology. 
In considering the future of Post Keynesian economics, or indeed heterodox economics more 
generally, it is therefore important that we distinguish between inconsistencies within partial 
analyses, within methodologies and between these and the underlying philosophical foundations. 
The philosophical position does not allow for ‘anything goes’. John King has drawn our attention 
to one important example of apparent inconsistency: the stance on microfoundations. For him it is 
consistency between the philosophical foundation on the one hand and methodology and theory 
on the other which is of primary importance. He has argued for a movement in the direction of 
more consistency between theory at the micro level and the macro level. But the guiding principle 
is consistency of each of micro and macro theory with the nature of the subject matter, rather than 
necessarily with each other.  
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At the same time as pursuing consistency in this sense, it is important not to be distracted by other 
charges of inconsistency which do not in fact make sense within a pluralist methodology or open-
systems epistemology. But the challenge is greater for such an approach relative to the simplicity 
and clarity of the consistency criterion in classical logic. The argument has to be made on a case-
by-case basis for particular segmentations of analysis into the multiple pluralist strands, based on 
consistency with understanding of the real context at hand, and then judgement needs to be applied 
in forming a conclusion based on this pluralist analysis. Consistency is important within partial 
analyses, but inconsistency in the sense of differences between analyses is to be expected, as long 
as it does not involve inconsistency with philosophical foundations.  
In seeking to summarise the case for this analysis of consistency, it is hard to put it better than the 
concluding statement in Hamouda and Harcourt (1988: 24-5): 
 ‘What we have tried to show is that, within the various strands which we have discerned 
and described, there are coherent frameworks and approaches to be found, though 
obviously there remain within each unfinished business and unresolved puzzles. The real 
difficulty arises when attempts are made to synthesize the strands in order to see whether 
a coherent whole emerges. Our own view is that this is a misplaced exercise, that to attempt 
to do so is mainly to search for what Joan Robinson called “only another box of tricks” to 
replace the “complete theory” of mainstream economics which all strands reject. The 
important perspective to take away is, we believe, that there is no uniform way of tackling 
all issues in economics and that the various strands in post Keynesian economics differ 
from one another, not least because they are concerned with different issues and often 
different levels of abstraction and analysis. 
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An important implication of the above conclusion is that the policies which may be 
rationalized by post Keynesian analysis are very much geared to concrete situations, the 
historical experiences and the sociological characteristics of the economies concerned. 
More generally, this approach which was that, for example, of Keynes, Kalecki, Joan 
Robinson and Arthur Okun, sometimes and most appropriately, has been dubbed the 
“horses for courses” approach.’ 
 
As John King puts it, within any partial analysis, each horse must ‘have four legs and a jockey and 
proceed anti-clockwise around the course’ and further that ‘all four legs must be pointing in the 
same direction’. There needs to be consistency in terms of the choice of methods to use (the horse) 
and ontology (the understanding of the nature of the racecourse and it current conditions) if there 
is to be a good chance of generating useful analysis (winning the race). Different open-system 
ontologies justify different choices of method (different types of horse). Relying exclusively as 
does mainstream economics on one method regardless of ontology (one type of horse chosen, e.g. 
for its aesthetic appeal) cannot reasonably be expected to succeed. But here the metaphor breaks 
down. Were it the case that all agreed on epistemology and thus on the criteria for success (the 
rules of the race), we would end up with a monist choice of approach (a clear winner). Rather the 
metaphor applies to the stage of planning for the race and placing bets – even under uncertainty, 
practicing economists must adopt one approach or another within the plurality on offer. We support 
the stable we judge to have the best range of horses to address the course as we understand it, and 
the ability to make the best choice of horse for particular conditions. 
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